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Why Jean Fernel (1497-1558) became a Physician 
[Centaurus, 53 (2011), pp. 193-220.] 
 
Introduction 
The historiography of the Scientific Revolution has always recognised the importance 
of mathematics in re-shaping natural knowledge and the practices associated with it 
during the late Renaissance and early modern periods. The historians of science who 
first forged the notion of a Scientific Revolution tended to interpret the historical 
developments in terms of elite natural philosophers (or even just “scientists”) 
recognising the importance of mathematics and deliberately introducing it into their 
attempts to understand the natural world. More recently, however, historians have 
realised the importance of a fairly extensive array of different mathematical 
practitioners, and have tended to see the Scientific Revolution as resulting from their 
innovations in both theory and practice. Mathematicians, not natural philosophers, 
showed the way to using mathematics in the understanding of the world.
1
 
 This recent work marks an important historiographical development, which 
has undoubtedly added to our understanding of the development of early modern 
attempts to establish knowledge of the physical world, and the best methods of 
discovering that knowledge. As such, it is a vast improvement on the earlier 
historiography. It seems to me, however, that the new historiography is tainted with 
some of the flaws inherent in the earlier historical accounts. Pioneers such as 
Alexandre Koyré, A. Rupert Hall, R. S. Westfall, and others, tended to give a 
teleological account, coloured by their knowledge that mathematics is such a crucially 
important part of the physical sciences of our day. Since every modern scientist 
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knows that mathematics is important, the historiographical argument seemed to run, 
an innovatory scientist in the past would have recognised it too (and in so doing 
would have confirmed his genius, and the fact that he was “ahead of his time”). In this 
kind of historical scenario, Galileo and Kepler were portrayed as physicists who 
recognised for the first time that physics should be firmly based on mathematical 
analysis of the natural world. Clearly, we’ve come a long way since then, and there is 
no denying the richness and nuanced authenticity of the history revealed in the more 
recent historiography. Even so, there seems to be a tendency among early modern 
historians of the physical sciences to regard the rise of mathematics, once its 
relevance was recognised, as inevitable and inexorable. Historiographical teleology 
and presentism still linger. 
 Part of the aim of this paper is to counter this tendency by reminding ourselves 
of the difficulties that lay in the way of the ‘mathematization of the world picture’. 
Far from being inexorable, or inevitable, there were many obstacles in the way that 
might have undermined the enterprise of mathematical physics altogether, and 
certainly delayed what we might regard as its eventual triumph by a couple of 
centuries. The mathematization of the world picture was a long and slow process. But 
this is not to say that the Scientific Revolution also had to mark time, so to speak, 
until non-mathematicians were made to realise the importance, indeed the 
indispensability, of mathematics. I am not offering here an explanation of why the 
‘Revolution’ took such a long time to be accomplished (much less suggesting that the 
delay was entirely due to opposition to mathematics). Rather, my point is that there 
was much more to the Scientific Revolution than the mathematization of the world 
picture. And I do not mean by this simply to point out the obvious fact that there were 
also contemporary innovations outside the physical sciences. We need to bear in mind 
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that, before the mathematization of the world picture, there was a majority of natural 
philosophers who believed that mathematics was not relevant to, much less necessary 
for, an understanding of the physics of the world. For such thinkers, the process of 
reforming scholastic natural philosophy, even in those parts of it which we would 
characterize as the physical sciences, could proceed perfectly well without any help 
from mathematics. Indeed, they had very good reasons for supposing that, if the 
reform of natural philosophy was to succeed, it must do so without making any 
diversions into the realm of mathematics.  
This is precisely why historians of the Scientific Revolution have found 
themselves turning from natural philosophers to mathematicians in order to 
understand developments. Only mathematicians saw the importance of mathematics, 
but they did not have it all their own way. On the contrary, many natural philosophers 
either dismissed the relevance of mathematics, or simply failed to regard it. I have 
argued elsewhere that the claims in recent historiography that early modern 
mathematicians were chiefly responsible for introducing the experimental method into 
natural philosophy have been overstated (Henry, 2011). In this paper, I want to 
address the assumption, explicit or implicit in modern accounts, that mathematics was 
recognised in the early modern period, as it is today, as inherently useful. In fact, the 
usefulness of mathematics was by no means apparent, even to the learned, in early 
modern Europe. For a complete understanding of the mathematization of the world 
picture, we need to look not just at the mathematicians, but at those who had little 
regard for mathematics. 
 I want to illustrate this by considering a single case study, although I will try 
to use it to make some more general observations. The case study concerns the 
eventual career choice of a would-be mathematician, by the name of Jean Fernel. This 
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is, indeed, the same Jean Fernel now known to history as one of the most innovatory 
and influential medical thinkers of the sixteenth century. Biographical evidence 
suggests, however, that Fernel tried to make a name for himself, and a living, as a 
mathematical practitioner, before he completely abandoned mathematics for 
medicine. Fernel’s achievements as a mathematician were not inconsiderable, but they 
have attracted scant scholarly attention. Another aim of this paper, therefore, is to 
consider for the first time, Fernel the mathematician. 
 The major source of information about Fernel’s life and work (apart from 
Fernel’s own writings) is a short biography written by his secretary for the last ten 
years of his life, the physician and humanist scholar Guillaume Plancy (1514–ca. 
1568), who had previously been a student of the French humanist scholar Guillaume 
Budé, and had worked with him until his death in 1540.
2
 Although the best source, 
Plancy’s Vita is by no means impeccable, and shows some inconsistencies; it is 
important, therefore, before going any further, to be aware of its shortcomings. 
 Plancy wrote the biography after Fernel’s death, but we do not know how long 
after. Plancy was definitely dead by 1574, and was reported to have died in 1568. His 
life of Fernel was not published until 1607, and there is evidence that Plancy had not 
properly refined and finished it, and that the manuscript from which it was published 
was in poor physical condition (Sherrington, 1946, pp. 147-50). But, even if we 
assume Plancy wrote the biography in 1558, it is clear that he did not have first hand 
knowledge of Fernel’s life before he began to work for him, in about 1548. In what 
follows, we are chiefly concerned with the period from about 1524 to 1530. The 
account of this period (as we shall see) includes some notable personal details of 
Fernel’s working and family life, but we have no way to check these against any other 
source.
3
 It seems unlikely (being too impertinent and disrespectful) that Plancy would 
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have fabricated his own account of these matters, but it is important to bear in mind 
that what he wrote was based on Fernel’s recollections of a period many years before, 
and must inevitably have been coloured by Plancy’s own preoccupations.  
 For our purposes, however, the important aspect of Plancy’s account of this 
early part of Fernel’s career is the attitude to mathematics that it displays. It seems to 
me that, even if (as seems likely) this aspect has been embellished by Plancy’s own 
scant regard for mathematics, it was not gratuitously intruded into the biography by 
Plancy. In what follows, therefore, I shall assume that Plancy’s Vita gives a fairly 
honest account of these episodes in Fernel’s life. But even if this is not the case, and 
Plancy offers in these parts of the Vita what we would consider to be a largely 
fictionalised account to enable him to promote his own anti-mathematical stance, it 
does not undermine my point. Either way, the case study shows anti-mathematical 
attitudes; as held by Fernel’s family (and conceded by Fernel himself) in the 1520s, or 
as held by Plancy sometime in the period between 1558 and 1574 (to say nothing of 
the opinions held by the several publishers who included the Vita in successive 
editions of Fernel’s Universa medicina from 1607 to 1680) (Sherrington, 1946, pp. 
149-50).
4
 
 
Jean Fernel, mathematician 
Jean Fernel became one of the most historically significant medical thinkers of the 
sixteenth century. At a time when severe cracks were beginning to show in the 
edifices of both Galenism, and the Aristotelian natural philosophy with which it was 
so closely linked, Fernel was one of only three thinkers who tried to develop a revised 
system of medical theory.
5
 The other two would-be reformers were Paracelsus, 
leading promoter of iatrochemistry, and Girolamo Fracastoro, the author of De 
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contagione (1546), in which discussion of the causative “seeds” of disease has often 
been seen as a foreshadowing of germ theory.
6
 Historiographically speaking, 
therefore, Fernel is in distinguished company. 
 
This portrait of Jean Fernel, which first appeared in his Medicina (Paris, 1554), sig. 
*iiiv, is the only known contemporary likeness. 
 
The son of a successful furrier and innkeeper, Fernel was born at Montdidier 
in the diocese of Amiens, and although he moved with his family to Clermont, near 
Paris, when he was twelve years old, he always designated himself as ‘of Amiens’ 
(Ambianus). He took a Master’s degree from the Collège de Ste Barbe, of the 
University of Paris, in 1519 and subsequently taught philosophy there while studying 
for the doctorate in medicine, which he was awarded in 1530. He lectured on 
Hippocrates and Galen at the Collège de Cornouailles for six years until his medical 
practice became so successful that he was forced to give up teaching. It was at this 
time, however, that he wrote the work (completed by 1538) which he later published 
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as De abditis rerum causis (1548; Fernel, 2005). This offered a new theory of 
contagious and pestilential diseases, which had always been anomalous with regard to 
ancient theories of disease. Fernel’s new theory moved closer to what historians of 
medicine, following Owsei Temkin (1977), call an ontological concept, rather than a 
physiological concept of disease (in which diseases are regarded as having their own 
independent existence, as opposed to being merely the result of an imbalance of the 
four bodily humours). Fernel saw his new theory as additional to, not a replacement 
for, Galenic theory and accordingly decided to clarify the nature and extent of the 
standard theory, before publishing his own. The result was the fullest exposition of 
Renaissance Galenism ever written, the De naturali parte medicina of 1542. For 
subsequent editions Fernel appropriated the term physiologia (which then signified 
the study of nature in general) as the title of this work (Fernel, 2003), and so gave rise 
to the modern usage of ‘physiology’ as the study of living systems. Fernel’s 
reputation as a practitioner increased after he succeeded in curing the serious illness 
of Diane de Poitiers (1499–1566), beloved mistress of Prince Henri (1519–99). At this 
time, Fernel feigned an illness of his own in order to avoid taking the post of chief 
physician to Henri, and when Henri became king in 1547 he avoided this post again 
by saying the position was the hereditary right of Henri’s father’s chief physician. 
Fernel ran out of excuses in 1556 and finally accepted the post of royal physician. 
Fernel attended the king at Calais in January 1557, when Henri brought an end to the 
English occupation, but he died at Fontainebleau the following year. It should be clear 
from this brief biography that in his day Fernel was recognised as one of the most 
successful medical practitioners in Europe, and inspired a group of followers, “more 
numerous than soldiers from the Trojan horse” (Sherrington, 1946, p. 155; Fernel, 
1607, sig. *7v) who practised medicine all over Europe.
7
 Furthermore, as a would-be 
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reformer of medical theory it seems fair to say that his influence upon his 
contemporaries was at least as great as Fracastoro’s, and even rivalled that of 
Paracelsus (particularly among more conservative thinkers who found Paracelsianism 
hard to stomach). 
In view of all this, it might seem that Fernel’s interest in medicine was bred in 
the bone, and that his achievement must have been the result of an unwavering 
commitment to medicine from an early age. In fact, this was very definitely not the 
case. Although devoted in his youth to assiduous study—so much so  that he was only 
forced to break off his studies when overwork caused him to succumb to a ‘quartan 
fever’—Fernel initially had no thought of any particular career. It was only after the 
enforced convalescence following this fever, when Fernel was already 27, that he 
‘began to talk over with his friends the career he should take up’ (Sherrington, 1946, 
p. 151; Fernel, 1607, sig. *4v). Rejecting divinity and jurisprudence, Plancy says that 
he chose medicine. Even then, however, Fernel spent a couple of years devoted to 
‘studies introductory to medicine’, namely philosophy and mathematics. Study for the 
MD took four years, Plancy tells us, and we known Fernel completed his MD in 1530. 
It was only in 1526 therefore, at the age of 29, that Fernel took up medicine. Even 
then, however, Fernel was evidently not fully committed. After the ‘first two years of 
basic work for the doctorate’, when many of Fernel’s fellow students were awarded ‘a 
first class’, Fernel only achieved a second class award. Plancy suggests that this was 
merely because Fernel, unlike his first class fellows, did not resort to bribes: ‘A “first” 
would assuredly have been granted’, Plancy wrote, ‘had the furnishing of his purse 
been equal to that of his head’ (Sherrington, 1946, p. 153; Fernel, 1607, sig.sig. *5r). 
There was another significant factor, however, which might explain Fernel’s 
comparative underachievement in medicine. In precisely these first two years of his 
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medical studies, Fernel published three significant mathematical books. In spite of 
opting formally for a career in medicine, it seems that, at the outset of his working 
life, Fernel wanted nothing so much as to make a name for himself as a 
mathematician.  
 Now, in some respects Fernel’s simultaneous interest in both medicine and 
mathematics is not as surprising as it may seem to modern readers. Although these 
two areas of study now seem widely separated to us, this was certainly not the case in 
Fernel’s time. Although the mathematical quadrivium was regarded as propaedeutic 
to the studies in each of the higher faculties (theology, law and medicine), geometry 
and astronomy, in conjunction with astrology, continued to be taught at more 
advanced levels in the faculty of medicine. It was not unusual, therefore, to find the 
most advanced mathematicians working not in the Arts Faculties but in the Medical 
Schools.
8
 Furthermore, many leading physicians at this time also published works in 
mathematics. Consider, for example, Alessandro Achillini’s Quatuor libri de orbibus 
(Bologna, 1498), Girolamo Fracastoro’s Homocentrica sive de stellis (Venice, 1538), 
and Girolamo Cardano’s Ars magna: sive de regulis algebraicis (Nuremburg, 1545). 
And let us not forget that even Nicolaus Copernicus was training to be a physician as 
he began to formulate his reformed cosmology. As Charles Webster has pointed out, 
‘Leading astronomers and cosmologers of the renaissance were educated as 
physicians; the two avocations were compatible and partly interchangeable’ (Webster, 
1982, p. 4). 
 Furthermore, after the bout of quartan fever which led him to decide upon a 
career, Fernel could not have formally chosen a career in mathematics if he had 
wanted to, for the simple reason that there was no such thing as a career in 
mathematics. As Kirsti Anderson and Henk Bos have recently pointed out, 
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‘mathematicians did not come from a well-defined group that earned their living from 
mathematics’ (Anderson and Bos, 2006, p. 697). Moreover, as Michael Mahoney has 
insisted, ‘one is hard pressed to find even a single, unified discipline of mathematics’ 
(Mahoney, 1994, p. 2).
 Mahoney himself discerns ‘six broad categories’ of 
mathematician: classical geometers, cossist algebraists, applied mathematicians, those 
artists or artisans concerned with geometrical perspective and other aspects of 
projective geometry, mathematical magicians, and a group he calls the analysts who 
emerged a bit later in the early modern period, and who combined geometry and 
algebraic techniques in problem solving, and shared with the applied mathematicians 
a concern for pragmatism (Mahoney, 1994, pp. 2-14). 
Although there were some opportunities for such practitioners as private 
tutors, or as professors of mathematics in the universities, neither option was very 
lucrative. Professors of mathematics were even lower down the academic hierarchies 
than professors of natural philosophy, who were generally paid much less than 
professors in the higher faculties. The low status of mathematics in the universities 
clearly reflected a generally low opinion of mathematics among men of letters; 
although it was possible to take a degree in the liberal arts, it was not possible to take 
a degree in mathematics. Furthermore, the teaching of mathematics at university was 
generally of such a low level that it was not even intellectually rewarding. 
Consequently, those who did teach mathematics in the university system, seldom 
made it a lifetime’s career; it was much more usually undertaken for a few years only 
by young men biding their time before making their next career move (either into 
natural philosophy, or medicine, or perhaps something completely different).
9
 This 
remained true in spite of some notable attempts to reform the university curricula in 
the sixteenth century. Jesuit colleges elevated mathematics to a much more important 
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position in their curricula, but generally mathematics remained a minor, propaedeutic 
study in the arts faculties (Mahoney, 1994, p. 12).
10
  
Those who did spend their lives working as mathematicians usually did so 
outside the university system, and either had private means, or were lucky enough to 
attract the commitment of a wealthy patron. In England, for example, Thomas Harriot 
and Thomas Digges were able to make life-long careers as mathematicians thanks to 
steady patronage. John Dee, by contrast, sought the patronage of his Queen, but never 
succeeded in winning reliable support and had to leave England for patronage abroad. 
Galileo, managed to escape a poorly paid position as a professor of mathematics at 
Pisa and subsequently Padua, when he attracted the patronage of Cosimo II de 
Medici, while René Descartes expressed his gratitude that he never had to earn a 
living, being sufficiently financially secure that he could always pursue his own 
ambitions.
11
  
 In view of all this, then, it might be supposed that Fernel was just another of 
those medical men who continued to indulge a passion for mathematics, at least in his 
youth, but that his interest in mathematics was as a mere sideline, and was 
unexceptionable among university-trained medical men. If we look more closely, 
however, at Plancy’s life of Fernel and at Fernel’s three mathematical publications, a 
rather different picture emerges. Compared to most of his fellow physicians, Fernel’s 
interest in, and commitment to, mathematics was altogether exceptional. So much so 
that it seems impossible to deny that for a while at least, he seriously entertained 
ambitions to make a living as a mathematician. 
 If this is true, however, we need to ask ourselves why Fernel might have opted 
for this unpromising career choice. After all, as Mahoney has pointed out, in 
mathematics ‘There were no positions to be gained or held. There was no ladder of 
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advancement leading into a hierarchical elite’ (Mahoney, 1994, p. 21). What inspired 
Fernel to think that he might, against the odds, make a living as a mathematical 
practitioner? 
 It so happened that mathematics had enjoyed something of a revival in Paris 
during the opening decades of the sixteenth century. In 1495, seeking to reform the 
Arts curriculum at the Collège du Cardinal Lemoine, of the University of Paris, the 
leading French humanist Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples (c. 1455-1536), placed renewed 
emphasis upon the importance of the mathematical quadrivium. The study of 
mathematics was subsequently encouraged by his colleagues, Jossé Clichtove (1472-
1543), and Charles de Bovelles (1479-1553). Furthermore, these three scholars 
published between them a considerable number of mathematical works. These 
included new editions of the arithmetics of Boethius and Jordanus de Nemore, and of 
the Sphaera of Sacrobosco, as well as treatises on geometry, astronomy, music, 
squaring the circle, doubling the cube, and so forth (Victor, 1978, pp. 36-44). 
 Furthermore, these three attracted into their circle a student at the Collège de 
Navarre who subsequently went on to become the leading French mathematician of 
his generation, Oronce Fine (1494-1555) (Marr, 2009). If his three older mentors were 
more interested in the mystical side of mathematics (they were interested in the 
theological use of number symbolism), Fine was much more concerned with the 
pragmatic aspects of mathematics.
12
 Although he too edited earlier works, including 
Euclid’s Elements (1536) and Peurbach’s Theoricae novae planetarum (1525), he was 
also an inventor of mathematical instruments, a leading cosmographer, and an 
influential mathematical teacher (including Petrus Ramus among his students). 
Undoubtedly, as one recent commentator has suggested, Fine was ‘one of the 
progenitors of a French renaissance of mathematics’ (Marr, 2009, p. 5). Fine became 
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especially active in publishing mathematical works following his release from a short 
prison sentence (possibly for charges connected with his practice of judicial 
astrology) in 1525, and in 1531 he was appointed to the newly established chair of 
mathematics in the Collège Royal, recently founded by François I (Pantin, 2009). 
Indeed, the king agreed to create a Royal chair of mathematics, alongside the more 
obviously humanist chairs of Greek and Hebrew, at the urging of Fine himself, who in 
an Epistre exhortative (1530) extolled the practical usefulness of mathematics and 
claimed that a chair of mathematics would lead to France ‘surpassing in sciences’ 
(Marr, 2009, pp. 7-8; Pantin, 2009, p. 17). 
 In view of this background, it is easier to understand why a brilliant young 
man, whose friends felt he could make a successful career in any of the three 
traditional professions, divinity, law, or medicine, might have harboured ambitions 
instead of forging a career in mathematics. Indeed, Plancy even records that, after his 
episode of quartan fever, when Fernel ‘began to talk over with his friends the career 
he should take up’, some of his friends proposed mathematics (‘alii mathematicas 
disciplinas… proponebant’) (Sherrington, 1946, p. 151; Fernel, 1607, sig. *4v). If we 
can assume that this is an accurate report, and a career in mathematics really was 
suggested by some of Fernel’s friends, it surely counts as testimony to the respect for 
mathematics in contemporary Paris, following the reformist educational schemes of 
Lefèvre d’Étaples and his circle, and the urgent activities of Fernel’s almost exact 
contemporary, Oronce Fine. 
Be that as it may, Plancy, having no interest in, and presumably therefore no 
knowledge of, this burgeoning of early sixteenth-century French mathematics, simply 
tells us that Fernel became determined to master mathematics:  
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he was unskilled in mathematics, so that he would stumble over examples 
commonly given by authorities in their exposition (of the subject); he felt it a 
scandal to be ignorant in a field of learning, which he admired no less than any 
other. So it was that he set out to cultivate his mind systematically, 
apportioning distinct and separate periods to his several studies. He gave the 
morning to arithmetic and mathematics; after the midday meal he turned to 
natural philosophy, and after supper to the Latin classics, paying special 
attention to their style (Sherrington, 1946, p. 151; Fernel, 1607, sig.sig. *4v). 
The liberal arts consisted of seven subjects, grouped as a foursome and a triad. 
Fernel’s day, it seems, was divided into studying the mathematical subjects of the 
quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music—essentially the 
mathematics of proportions) in the morning, and the trivium of linguistic studies 
(grammar, logic and rhetoric) in the evening. The afternoon was devoted to the 
natural philosophy of Aristotle which had long since become the mainstay of the 
university Arts curriculum, additional to the seven liberal arts.  
 According to Plancy, at this time Fernel ‘thought every hour lost which was 
not spent in reading and studying’, but his father, having seen Fernel through his 
university education to the MA, felt that he could no longer justify (to the rest of the 
family) paying for Fernel’s private studies (Sherrington, 1946, p. 151; Fernel, 1607, 
sig. *4r, and p. 152; Fernel, 1607, sig*4v). It was at this time (coinciding with the 
quartan fever that allegedly prompted him to consider his future) that Fernel decided 
to train as a physician. But, now having to pay his own way, he took a post as a 
lecturer in natural philosophy at the College of Ste Barbe in Paris. Moreover, Fernel 
did not abandon his mathematical studies, in order to make way for his medical 
studies. Indeed, if anything Fernel became much more focussed upon mathematics 
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than on anything else. This is evident from the biography which describes an 
extraordinary commitment to mathematics in Fernel’s daily life at this time. 
 Fernel had recently married and, using money from his wife’s dowry, he 
began to build up a collection of ‘the writings of all the old mathematicians’. But he 
did not stop there. He also built up a collection of astrolabes and other bronze 
mathematical instruments, many of which he had devised himself, and all of which 
were, as Plancy wrote, ‘costly’. What would undoubtedly have added to the cost was 
the fact that Fernel employed craftsmen and engravers to make these instruments for 
him, and they lived in the Fernel household. To off-set these expenses he gave lessons 
in mathematics to a number of ‘distinguished pupils’, and tried to earn money as a 
writer of mathematical treatises, and presumably by selling at least one of the 
mathematical instruments he invented, the so-called ‘monalosphaerium’. Indeed, his 
first book was an instruction manual for this instrument (Sherrington, 1946, pp. 153-
54; Fernel, 1607, sig. *5v-*6r; Fernel, 1527). 
 He also used the opportunity in his publications to ingratiate himself with 
potential patrons. He started, in his first publication, with Jacobus Govea, whom 
Fernel describes as ‘highly numerate and a renowned doctor of theology’, addressed 
the next to Johannes III, King of Portugal, and dedicated his final mathematical 
treatise before he committed himself to a medical career, to a Frenchman who acted 
as a patron to learned men, Martin Dolet.
13
 It seems clear that Fernel thought his best 
chance of a paying career in mathematics was through the newly burgeoning field 
known as cosmography. Accordingly, he dedicated the first two of his mathematical 
books to likely representatives of the greatest sea-faring nation at the time, Portugal.  
 
Jean Fernel, cosmographer 
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The period from 1490 to 1510, the period of the first major voyages of discovery, has 
recently been seen as marking a ‘cosmographic revolution’ (Vogel, 2006, p. 476). 
When Ptolemy’s Geography was first translated into Latin in 1406, the translators, 
Manuel  Chrysolaras and Jacopo d’Angelo, chose to translate the title as 
Cosmography. Ptolemy’s work, as might be expected from the author of the 
Almagest, was a mathematical treatment of various aspects of the Earth, including 
techniques for making map projections, the imposition of lines of latitude and 
longitude, and so forth. In some cases Ptolemy’s account required an understanding of 
the vault of the sky and its projection onto the surface of the Earth, and as such the 
book dealt with the whole world, or universe, not just the earth, and so 
‘cosmography’, the translators argued, was a more fitting title than ‘geography’ 
(Mosley, 2009, p. 425). Ptolemy’s Cosmography was first printed in 1475, and 
subsequently appeared in at least six editions before 1490. 
 One of the important aspects of Ptolemy’s work was that it assumed that there 
was one single globe of earth and water—a terraqueous globe. This, together with the 
experiences reported by those who undertook the various voyages of discovery, led to 
the final dismissal of an influential alternative view. The alternative, promoted by 
scholastic natural philosophers and supposedly based on abstract philosophical 
considerations derived from Aristotle, held that the sphere of the Earth was floating in 
a larger sphere of water, with only part of its top hemisphere above the surface of the 
water. Although the Ptolemaic view was held by a number of thinkers before this 
period, the final dismissal of the scholastic view can indeed be held to be a 
cosmographic revolution (Randles, 1993; Vogel, 2006). Although cosmography 
subsequently developed in a number of different ways (Mosley, 2009), it certainly led 
to a new field of applied mathematics, and seemed to offer new opportunities to men 
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like Oronce Fine and Jean Fernel. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Fernel should 
try to master this new cosmography. Certainly, Fernel’s first two mathematical books 
mark their author out as someone with great ambitions as a cosmographer. 
 Fernel’s first publication, Monalosphaerium, partibus constans quatuor, as the 
title made clear, was specifically concerned with describing his newly invented 
‘monalosphaerium’ and instructing the reader in its various uses. Fernel’s instrument 
was essentially an astrolabe which managed to project all the information provided in 
different inscribed sections of an astrolabe on to one circle. He admitted its similarity 
to an astrolabe but believed it was an improvement upon the traditional instrument 
because it was equally comprehensive, but more convenient in use (Fernel, 1527, sig. 
Avir). The altitudes of the Sun, Moon and stars could be read from the 
monalosphaerium, and the lunar cycle derived from it. Thanks to inscribed 
coordinates of latitude and longitude of major cities, the latitude and longitude of any 
place could be found, and distances from one place to another. It was also useful, at 
least on a starry night, for giving the time in ‘equal hours’, and could be used to 
proceed from equal hours to unequal, and vice versa (Fernel, 1527, ff. 5r, 18r). And, 
of course, it could be used as a perpetual calendar, particularly for calculating Easter 
and other moveable feasts (Fernel, 1527, f. 7v). Fernel also showed how it could be 
used for determining the critical days in various fevers, and for drawing up 
horoscopes. 
 For good measure, Fernel provides a fourth and final part to the book which 
bears little relation to the first three parts, but which shows the reader how to calculate 
various things, such as the height of a tower, the distance between two places, and the 
depth of a cistern. The work closes with some discussion of the measurement of areas, 
and how to relate the area of a triangle to that of a square, or even to the volume of a 
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cube. This section seems to provide Fernel with the opportunity of showing what he 
himself can do as a mathematician, after previously confining himself to describing 
the monalosphaerium, since he declares himself to be now off the leash (Fernel, 1527, 
f. 25r).  
In the dedication, Fernel says that he wrote the work in response to Jacques 
Govea’s request for a work that would enable the young to pluck attractive blooms, 
and other resources from the mathematical disciplines, and thus adorn the rest of the 
arts, as if with jewels: ‘For mathematics is of a nature to bring lustre to tired topics, 
and to keep a mind in one’s body that is imbued with incredible life-long pleasure’ 
(Fernel, 1527, sig. Avir). Although Govea, who later became Rector of the College of 
Ste Barbe, was only at the beginning of his career there when Fernel dedicated the 
book to him, he already had the ear of the King of Portugal and that would be enough 
for Fernel to want to cultivate his friendship. Fernel tells us in the dedicatory epistle 
that after charging him with this duty to the young, Govea left Paris to visit the King 
of Portugal. Perhaps Fernel hoped that important French readers might be spurred into 
making sure that Fernel should continue to work for French maritime interests, rather 
than be tempted away by the attentions of the Portuguese (Sherrington, 1946, p. 172). 
Be that as it may, Fernel aimed at the top of the Portuguese tree with his next, 
and surely most important, work, Cosmotheoria. He dedicated this to the King of 
Portugal himself, João III (Fernel, 1528a)). Not knowing the King personally, he 
resorted to praising the achievements of renowned Portuguese explorers, from Henry 
the Navigator (1394–1460), and Bartolomeu Dias (c. 1450–1500), the first European 
to round the Cape of Good Hope (1488), while searching for the legendary Christian 
kingdom of Prester John, to Paulo (d. 1499) and Vasco da Gama (c. 1469–1524), who 
extended these explorations to find a route to India (Fernel, 1528a, sig. Avir-v). 
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Clearly, Fernel was attempting to flatter the King by association. Fernel did not rely 
solely on flattery, however. He clearly hoped that the practical usefulness of the 
information provided in Cosmotheoria, would be immediately recognisable to the 
king and his advisers, and would therefore attract patronage.
14
 
The main theme of the Cosmotheoria is the size of the Earth and of the 
heavenly spheres. But right at the outset he rejects the scholastic view of the floating 
Earth partially protruding from a separate sphere of water, and affirms the Ptolemaic 
view that the earth and seas form a single globe. ‘One must thus agree’, he wrote, 
‘that the earth looks like a wooden globe in which there are many hollows in which 
water can gather’ (Fernel, 1528a, sig. Bv; Randles, 1993, pp. 67-9). It is perhaps this 
aspect of Fernel’s second book which has led a leading historian of cosmography to 
describe it as ‘one of the most original contributions to cosmography in the French 
Renaissance’ (Randles, 1993, p. 67). As a measure of the importance of this issue, it 
can be noted that Copernicus also discussed the same matters in Book 1, Chapter 3, of 
his De revolutionibus (1543), ‘How Earth forms a single sphere with water’. Indeed, it 
has been suggested that the confirmation of the Ptolemaic single globe of earth and 
sea by the Renaissance voyages of discovery were what made it possible for 
Copernicus to develop his theory of a planetary (wandering) Earth.
15
 
 Fernel’s Cosmotheoria is also famous for the attempt to establish the length of 
a degree of a great circle of the Earth. Taking with him a reliable clock, Fernel 
travelled due north (or nearly due north) of Paris until he found the place where the 
elevation of the Sun at noon corresponded to one degree north (presumably this took a 
few days to establish). He then returned to Paris by coach and counted the number of 
times one of the coach wheels made a full revolution. Knowing the circumference of 
the wheel, he was able to calculate the full distance. Given the fact that Fernel 
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counted 17,024 revolutions of the wheel, there was some room for error. It is a 
testimony to the care with which he undertook this measurement, however, that the 
surprising accuracy of his result continued to impress subsequent investigators and 
commentators (Fernel, 2005, p. 10). Fernel declares the length of a degree of a great 
circle of the Earth to be 700 stadia, or 87½ Italian milliaria. But he then tries to help 
the reader to be able to understand these lengths in their own local terms. He starts 
with a digitus, which he says is the length of four grains of barley. Four digiti are a 
palmus; four palmi make a pes; and a cubit is one and a half pedes, or six palms. He 
then arrives at a measure for a passus geometricus of five pedes. The Italian stadium 
is 125 passus, and an Italian milliarium is eight stadia, or one thousand passus. A 
German milliarium, however, has 4000 passus, and the Swedish variety has 5000 
(Fernel, 1528a, f. 2r). 
 Having dealt in the first chapter with the size of the Earth, Fernel went on to 
discuss the dimensions of the sphere of air, and the sphere of fire, before dealing with 
each of the heavenly spheres in turn, including the sphere of the fixed stars, and the 
primum mobile. Although primarily concerned with the physical dimensions of the 
spheres, Fernel also considers the sizes of the circles (deferents and epicycles) 
assumed by astronomers in accounting for the precise motions of the heavenly bodies. 
There is nothing particularly new in the general approach, since it is based on the 
standard assumption that the heavenly spheres are nested contiguous with one 
another, and is in keeping with Peurbach’s Theoricae novae planetarum (1454, 
published posthumously, by Regiomantanus, in 1472). Clearly, however, Fernel was 
convinced that he was offering a new and more accurate assessment of the heavenly 
dimensions.
16
 It seems reasonable to suppose that Fernel believed that an accurate 
idea of the relevant dimensions would facilitate much needed improvements in 
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astronomy. It should not be forgotten that Fernel was writing not long after 
Copernicus had written his Commentariolus (ca. 1512), the first unpublished account 
of his heliocentric astronomy (and known only to a few, which did not include Fernel) 
(Copernicus, 1985, pp. 81-90). This was a time, therefore, when astronomers were 
casting around for a way to improve the principles of their art. Evidently, Fernel did 
not have Copernicus’s creative flair (not in astronomy, anyway—it would be a 
different matter when he finally turned to medicine), but by emphasising the 
improved accuracy of his measurements and calculations he was in good company. 
Even half a century later, Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) was pinning his hopes for the 
future of astronomy on more accurate assessments of planetary movements, rather 
than on the more drastic Copernican reforms (Thoren, 1990).  
 Fernel’s third, and final, mathematical treatise is rather different from the 
other two. Instead of focussing upon astronomical or cosmographical matters, it takes 
a much broader approach, seeking to show the value of mathematics in a number of 
different areas. Also, it is not dedicated to a potential Portuguese patron, but is 
dedicated to the now highly obscure Martin Dolet. It is possible that Fernel saw Dolet 
as a likely patron himself, or perhaps Dolet acted as a patronage broker. Fernel 
describes him in the dedication as a ‘most devoted patron and protector of learned 
men’ (Fernel, 1528b, sig. Aiiiir). Perhaps Fernel sensed that he was not going to 
succeed in attracting Portuguese patronage, and felt that broader claims about the 
usefulness of mathematics, rather than a focus on cosmography, were required if he  
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Fernel’s depiction of the sphere of Mercury, and table showing the various 
dimensions of different aspects of the sphere, including the epicycle and the body of 
the planet. From Fernel, Cosmotheoria, f.12v and f. 13r. with acknowledgement to 
Edinburgh University Library, Special Collections Department, Df.1.18/3. 
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was to have any sway with French patrons. De proportionibus, accordingly, is 
concerned with the proposition that ‘everything in nature (how much more so, in 
people and in medications) is created in a fixed proportion of components’. It was for 
this reason, Fernel says, that the ‘ancient philosophers’ believed ‘harmony is the sole 
principle of all things’ (Fernel, 1528b, sig. Aiiiir).  
 Fernel describes the mathematics of proportions as ‘a weapon considerably 
concealed’, because of the difficulty of using it, but which can be used in many 
different spheres. Ethical philosophy, he claims, deals with things which are so 
inextricably linked that only the theory of proportions can sort them out. Here he is 
drawing upon the suggestion of mathematically inclined humanists that music, as the 
discipline of proportions and balance, offers a science of the good life. The theory of 
proportions was seen, therefore, as an important scientia activa, essential for 
understanding both moral and political science.
17
 Similarly, even the study of the 
pulse in medicine relies upon a theory of proportions, we are told, since Galen 
attributed the pulses to musical harmonies in the body.
18
 There is, in short, Fernel 
says, a diverse harvest to be reaped, from geometry and astronomy to natural 
philosophy, and beyond. 
 In view of all this, it could hardly be said that Fernel had merely a dilettante’s 
interest in mathematics, or that his interest in mathematics went no further than that of 
other physicians. On the contrary, it seems impossible to deny that he was aiming to 
establish himself as a member of what he perhaps saw, in the period immediately 
following the revival of mathematics by Lefèvre d’Étaples and his circle and 
reinforced subsequently by Oronce Fine, as a growing community of vocational 
mathematical practitioners. Furthermore, in view of the nature of his publications and 
his attempts to win patronage for the kind of work detailed in them, it seems likely 
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that he harboured genuine ambitions to establish himself as a leading cosmographer. 
The fact that he was producing his mathematical works while working towards his 
MD should not be seen as diminishing his separate commitment to mathematics.  
 
Jean Fernel, mathematician manqué, and physican 
Why, then, did Fernel abandon mathematics and turn his attention entirely to 
medicine? After publishing his De proportionibus in 1528, Fernel never again wrote a 
mathematical work. All his subsequent publications were medical and, unlike his 
mathematical writings, they immediately established Fernel’s reputation as a leader in 
the medical arts and sciences. Furthermore, by the time his first medical publication 
appeared, the De naturali parte medicinae, in 1542, Fernel had long since sold off his 
collection of mathematical books and his collection of instruments. He had dismissed 
the instrument makers and engravers he had employed and housed, and he had 
notified his private mathematical pupils that ‘they must look elsewhere for a master’ 
(Sherrington, 1946, p.154; Fernel, 1607, sig. *6v). What caused this dramatic change 
of direction?  
 The answer is very clear in Plancy’s account of Fernel’s life. It was apparent 
to Fernel’s family, and in particular to his wife and his father-in-law, who lived in 
Paris and ‘often saw his son-in-law’, that Fernel was not making a suitable living out 
of his pursuit of mathematics. On the contrary, Fernel was ‘dipping into his wife’s 
marriage portion’ to fund his expensive indulgence in mathematics. Plancy hints at a 
domestic scene in which Fernel’s wife became increasingly distressed by the financial 
hardship into which Fernel seemed to be leading her and their two daughters. 
Whenever Fernel’s father-in-law came to visit,  
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he would take occasion to complain to his son-in-law that medicine, which 
had been his whole devotion formerly, now concerned him too little. He so 
clung to mathematics that neither love of his wife, nor the endearments of his 
children, nor the care of his house, could take him off them (Sherrington, 
1946, pp. 153-4; Fernel, 1607, sig. *5v-*6r). 
Eventually matters came to a head and Plancy tells us that the father-in-law, ‘moved 
by his daughter’s tears, lost his temper and scolded his son-in-law.’ It was as a result 
of these ‘entreaties and reproaches’ that ‘Fernel gave way at last’ and ‘renounced his 
mathematics and began to devote himself to medicine with a greater zeal than ever 
before’ (Sherrington, 1946, p. 154; Fernel, 1607, sig. *6v).19  
 It is perhaps worth remarking that the family’s concern about the comparative 
earning power of mathematics and medicine was surely vindicated. Long before the 
end of his life, Fernel’s earnings as a physician turned him into a wealthy man. As 
Plancy tells us, and this time he has first-hand knowledge: 
Throughout the time I lived with him (and I lived with him for ten years) his 
annual income often exceeded twelve thousand French pounds and rarely fell 
below ten (Sherrington, 1946, p. 170; Fernel, 1607, sig. ***2v). 
Just three years before this, Oronce Fine had died after enduring years of financial 
hardship. Dependent on courtly patronage, Fine all too often found himself, in spite of 
his undeniable achievements, ‘waiting and begging for payment for his efforts and 
being mocked and put off with courtly pittances’ (Marr, 2009, p. 9, quoting Fine’s 
son, writing in 1560). 
It is evident that Fernel’s own efforts to attract patronage repeatedly failed, 
and his pursuit of mathematics, in spite of his private tutoring, cost him more than it 
brought in. Sir Charles Sherrington, noting the sumptuousness of Fernel’s 
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mathematical treatises, assumed that he must have ‘had a generous patron at his 
back’. Each of the books was evidently published with a separate book of plates (no 
copies of which are known to survive), so they were clearly expensive to produce.
20
 
Sherrington’s assumption may well be correct but it only makes it more likely, rather 
than less, that Fernel was hoping to attract further patronage following upon his 
publications. Alternatively, Sherrington’s surmise may be wrong. Given that Fernel 
does not thank an already generous benefactor in his dedicatory epistles, but merely 
solicits for future patronage, it seems likely that Fernel actually paid for the printing 
of these books himself. Fernel is known to have employed his own engravers, and the 
excellent engraved illustrations in these three books (to say nothing of the lost extra 
booklets of plates), show every sign of having been closely supervised by the author. 
Perhaps this is why, as Plancy tells us, Fernel had to dip ‘into his wife’s marriage-
portion’ (Sherrington, 1946, p. 153; Fernel, 1607, sig. *5v). If so, then he would 
certainly be hoping that the expenditure on the books would eventually pay dividends 
by attracting sufficient interest that he might win patronage from them. When all this 
failed, it must have seemed obvious to everyone around him, and eventually even to 
Fernel himself, that mathematics was not a good choice of career, particularly if the 
option of a medical career was open to him. 
 
Fernel and the usefulness (or not) of mathematics 
It is possible, however, to discern another important factor in Fernel’s decision to 
abandon mathematics. It is usual in the historiography of mathematics, particularly in 
accounts of its gradual recognition during the Scientific Revolution as a crucially 
important way of understanding the world, to emphasise its practical utility. In 
contrast to the contemplative natural philosophy of the pre-modern world, 
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mathematics was always seen to provide practical information which could be put to 
use for the benefit of all. Or so the story goes. Plancy’s Life, however, presents a 
rather different attitude to mathematics. It seems that the pragmatic usefulness of 
mathematics was by no means obvious to everyone.  
 Plancy presents this alternative view of mathematics in a re-imagined 
quotation from Fernel’s father-in-law: 
‘Now, knowledge of mathematics is in itself as culture well enough, and 
exercises the wits, if one uses moderation in the time given to it. But it 
becomes a scandal when an honest man with duties to the public and his 
family reposes, so to say, to sleep on the quick-sands of the sirens, letting the 
years go by. Mathematics made no contribution to the public weal. Apart from 
a modicum of arithmetic and geometry it touched society little or not at all. On 
the other hand when we turn our gaze and thought to medicine we find it a 
science occupied either with sublime enquiry into Nature or with deeds of 
beneficence and utility. It is of right the worthiest of all the arts. Mathematics 
offers no comparison with it’ (Sherrington, 1946, p. 154; Fernel, 1607, sig. 
*6r). 
It is impossible to tell whether this quotation was reconstructed by Fernel in 
reminiscence, and told to Plancy while he was gathering information for the Life, or 
whether Plancy himself imagined it as typical of the kind of things any ‘man of 
experience’, as Plancy described Fernel’s father-in-law, would have said about 
mathematics. It seems certain, however, that Plancy himself did concur with these 
views. Immediately after attributing these words to the father-in-law, Plancy says, ‘he 
urged on Fernel these and other good reasons.’ Furthermore, at this point in his 
narrative he depicts Fernel’s father-in-law not only as a man of experience but also as 
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‘prudent and accomplished’ (Sherrington, 1946, pp. 153-54; Fernel, 1607, sig. *6r-v). 
This dismissal of the value of mathematics does not emanate from a critic of no 
standing, therefore, but from a man of supposed worldly wisdom. 
 There are also echoes of these criticisms of mathematics in Plancy’s own 
comments in the Life. Even before recounting Fernel’s abandonment of mathematics, 
Plancy had felt it necessary to apologise to the reader for Fernel’s infatuation with the 
subject: ‘Contemplation of the stars and heavenly bodies excites such wonder and 
charm in the human mind that, once fascinated by it, we are caught in the toils of an 
enduring and delighted slavery, which holds us in bondage and serfdom’ 
(Sherrington, 1946, p. 153; Fernel, 1607, sig. *5v-*6r). This foreshadows the 
comment about sleeping on the quick-sands of the sirens. Similarly, the father-in-
law’s unfavourable comparison of mathematics with medicine is reflected later in the 
Life when Plancy says that Fernel ‘bitterly regretted that he had formerly given 
himself up’ to astrology, if not mathematics more generally.  
In what is an unusually long discussion of any one topic in the biography, 
Plancy first tells us that Fernel came to believe that judicial astrology was ‘erroneous 
and unfounded’, before going on to say that he himself was ‘entirely at one with the 
teaching of this great man’ on this topic. ‘My view’, he wrote, ‘is that these impostors 
with their judicial astrology, pressing with extravagant zeal this absurd and ridiculous 
view of the influence of the stars, outrage both heaven and medicine’ (Sherrington, 
1946, p. 159; Fernel, 1607, sig. **2r). 
 It is important to note here, however, that Plancy does not object to the idea 
that the stars can affect things on Earth. His objection is to the claim that knowledge 
of such things can be discovered through mathematics. Consider, for example, this 
comment on the cause of pestilence: 
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I recognise willingly that often the Divine Power, whose decrees and plans are 
inscrutable, permits, in punishment of man’s misdeeds, and in order to turn 
man back from his errors, pestilence and contagion, for him to bear. I will not 
deny even that the stars by their malignity corrupt the air to such a point that it 
becomes a source of mischief to man and beast, and sows the seeds of death. 
But I hold that none of these things can be foreseen by help of judicial 
astrology, and they are known only by their actual event.
21
 
The objection is not just to the divinatory aspects of astrology, but to the inadequacy 
of its causal claims: 
Against the laws of Nature, they view matter as taking exceptional and strange 
forms, and sublunar bodies undergoing certain changes. They attribute these 
happenings to the ‘aspects’ and the ‘conjunctions’ of the stars (Sherrington, 
1946, p. 159; Fernel, 1607, sig. **2r). 
Conjunctions occur when two heavenly bodies appear close together, or coincident, 
against the background of fixed stars, and the aspects are particular angular 
separations of heavenly bodies, such as 60 or 90 degrees, which are supposed to be 
particularly significant. For Plancy, however, it is clearly an absurdity to imagine that 
the geometrical configuration of the heavenly bodies can have any kind of physical 
effect.
22
 
 Another factor which prevented educated men from recognising any 
usefulness in mathematics derived from the strict separation of mathematics from 
natural philosophy. Deriving ultimately from Aristotle’s views, the prevailing view 
was that natural philosophy was concerned to provide explanations of natural 
phenomena in terms of physical causes, and that mathematics could say nothing about 
causes, but could only give a particular kind of technical description of what was 
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going on in a physical system. So, a specific set of deferent and epicycle, allocated a 
specific combination of movements, could show us how the observed movement of a 
particular planet could be accomplished, but this assumed set-up could say nothing 
about how or why (or even whether!) the planet moved in this way, or what kept it in 
these motions. Generally speaking, mathematics was regarded as incompetent with 
regard to natural philosophy (Dear, 1995; Mancosu, 1996). 
The most famous (or, as it is seen in the standard historiography of science, 
infamous) illustration of the gulf between mathematics and natural philosophy, of 
course, is the preface added to Copernicus’s De revolutionibus orbium coelestium by 
Andreas Osiander, the Lutheran minister who had been delegated to supervise it 
through the press. As Robert S. Westman has pointed out, Osiander’s wording  
reveals that he was not so much concerned that the nature of the physical world might 
be thrown into confusion by Copernicus’s heliocentric astronomy; rather he was 
concerned that ‘the liberal arts, established long ago on a correct basis, should not be 
thrown into confusion’ (Westman, 1980, pp. 108-9, quoting Osiander). Copernicus 
was in danger of throwing the liberal arts into confusion because his book might seem 
to imply that geometrical astronomy could reveal to us the true nature of the World 
system, whereas, as all educated men knew, only natural philosophy could establish 
physical truths.
23
  
If the recent historiography devoted to uncovering the history of cosmography 
has correctly recaptured events, it seems that Fernel should be counted as one of those 
who was convinced of the power of mathematics for deciding upon controversial 
philosophical matters (in particular the precise arrangement of the sub-lunar spheres 
(especially the spheres of earth and water), and therefore sought to promote the 
usefulness of cosmography, even before Copernicus’s more powerful version of 
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mathematical realism pointed the way to what has been seen as the ‘mathematization 
of the world picture.’ The definitive history of cosmography has yet to be written but 
its practitioners seem to have developed, even before Copernicus, a mathematical 
realist view of the world (as opposed to the more traditional instrumentalist view 
implicit, for example, in Osiander’s preface).24 Moreover, their confirmation of the 
earth as a single terraqueous globe was an important factor enabling Copernicus to 
proceed with his own realist astronomy.
25
 It is arguable, therefore, that the renewed 
philosophical debate on the relevance of mathematics to natural philosophy, which 
emerged at this time, may have had its beginnings in the ‘cosmographic revolution’, 
rather than the Copernican revolution. If Osiander was content merely to declaim that 
the liberal arts had been established ‘on a correct basis’, there were evidently others, 
who were willing to discuss the matter, pro and con.
 26
 
If these debates ultimately led to the recognition that mathematics, far from 
being excluded from natural philosophy, could, and indeed must, contribute to our 
understanding of the physical world, it was a long, slow, process.
27
 At the time that 
Fernel was writing his mathematical works, the majority of the inhabitants of the 
Republic of Letters were unaware of the claims being made on behalf of mathematics 
and continued to regard it as irrelevant to natural philosophy, and therefore of little or 
no use to their concerns. We should not be surprised, therefore, much less 
disappointed, that Fernel the mathematician , who showed in the late 1520s that he did 
believe in the relevance of mathematics to our understanding of the physical world 
(not only by his confirmation of the Ptolemaic terraqueous globe, but also by his 
clearly realist claims about the physical dimensions of the planetary spheres—
deferents, epicycles, and all), soon abandoned the idea; or did so to all intents and 
purposes by abandoning the study and promotion of mathematics itself.  
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 Another contemporary claim in favour of the usefulness of mathematics, 
which is at least implicit and sometimes explicit in Fernel’s three earliest publications, 
is its use in training the growing mind. It is clear from the lavish nature of his three 
mathematical books, no less than from their content, that Fernel should be included 
among the so-called ‘mathematical humanists’, who wished to elevate mathematics in 
the disciplinary hierarchy because of its perceived usefulness in pedagogy.
28
 We can 
see this, perhaps, in Fernel’s concern that his mathematical book should be accessible 
to those without much mathematical training. In De proportionibus, for example, he 
tells us that he ‘deviated slightly from ancient mathematical practice’ so that he could 
‘put the proofs of what he had to say in few words, to prevent inducing nausea and 
disgust in people with little mathematical training, who have particularly hated 
proportions’ (Fernel, 1528b, sig. Aiiiir). Fernel was among the first generation of 
mathematicians to begin to exploit the almost complete corpus of Ancient Greek 
mathematics which had been recovered by humanist manuscript collectors in the 
fifteenth century. For humanist mathematicians like Leon Battista Alberti (1404-
1472), and Luca Pacioli (1445-1517), mathematics was in itself as representative of 
ancient glories as ancient philosophy, and they showed no hint of needing to 
demonstrate the importance of mathematics to philosophy. In so far as there was any 
concern to link the two, it was only to defend a vision of human learning as all 
interdependent. Celio Calcagnini (1479-1541), for example, suggested that  
Knowledge is all one body, which the Greeks call paideia and we 
humanitas… Thus the disciplines or parts of humanitas are connected among 
themselves… No one may therefore pursue physics without logic, nor logic 
without mathematics, nor anything without the support of rhetoric (Calcagnini, 
1544, p. 23).
29
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It was, however, easy to recognise the beneficial characteristics of mathematics in its 
own right. In particular, it was praised for the certainty of its proofs. ‘The manifold 
proofs of arithmetic and geometry’, wrote Pier Paolo Vergerio (1370-1445), ‘make 
these sciences a delightful study, and one possessed of a special certainty…’ 
(Vergerio, 1918 [1472], p. 127, quoted from Rose, 1975, p. 13). The humanists 
recognised the pedagogical implications: 
Geometry ought to be studied at an early age for it sharpens the intellect and 
makes the mind quick at perceiving… It is fitting for the prince to be 
instructed in both geometry and arithmetic… Besides there is much eruditio in 
it and it produces much caution, since very often mathematics denies what is 
conceded by dialectic… Astronomy reveals the secrets of the heavens and its 
study must not be withheld from the prince.
30
 
 If Fernel shared these same humanist attitudes to mathematics, however, it is 
certain that he also knew the cautions against mathematics which could also be found 
in humanist writers. In particular, the humanists seemed to be well aware that, 
although a knowledge of mathematics could be highly useful, it was possible to go too 
far, and become lost in a world of utter abstraction. Indeed, this belief was expressed 
by two of the ancient sources for the humanists’ admiration of mathematics, 
Quintilian and Cicero. Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria (I, 10) and Cicero’s De officiis 
(I, 6) both cautioned that too much immersion in mathematics could be a distraction 
from the vita activa required of the good citizen. For Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, 
writing in 1450, 
though these [mathematical] sciences are all delightful and useful to 
comprehend, still I could not urge too much expenditure of time upon them, 
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because advantageous as they are for the transient student, they can be harmful 
for a visitor who stays too long (Piccolomini, 1940, p. 123).  
Similarly, Roger Ascham, in 1563 insisted that, 
Some wittes, moderate enough by nature, be many tymes marde by over much 
studie and use of some sciences, namelie, Musicke, Arithmetick, and 
Geometrie. Thies sciences, as they sharpen mens wittes over much, so they 
change mens maners over sore, if they be not moderatlie mingled, & wiselie 
applied to some good use of life. Marke all Mathematicall heades, which be 
onely and wholly bent to those sciences, how solitarie they be themselves, 
how unfit to live with others, & how unapte to serve in the world (Ascham, 
1904, p. 190). 
Ascham even goes so far as to say that such unfortunate cases are ‘knowen nowe by 
common experience’ (Ascham, 1904, p. 190). If this was so, then it is evident that by 
the late sixteenth century there were significant numbers of mathematicians who had 
failed to heed the warnings and had become such solitary figures, unfitted for society. 
 It seems, then, that Fernel could hardly have been surprised to hear his father-
in-law announcing that ‘mathematics is in itself as culture well enough, and exercises 
the wits, if one uses moderation in the time given to it. But it becomes a scandal when 
an honest man, with duties to the public, and his family reposes, so to say, to sleep on 
the quick-sands of the sirens’. His wife’s father was drawing from the same humanist 
literature to criticise mathematics that Fernel used to defend it, and he was adding 
nothing new to these age-old strictures. Similarly, Fernel would not have been 
surprised had he seen Plancy’s later description of him as ‘fascinated’ by 
mathematics, and ‘caught in the toils of an enduring and delighted slavery’ which held 
him ‘in bondage and serfdom’ (Sherrington, 1946, pp. 154, 153; Fernel, 1607, *6r). 
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Indeed, it was perhaps Fernel’s own admiration for the humanists and their values that 
enabled him to recognise that he was in danger of becoming the kind of solitary 
thinker they warned against.  
 It should not be supposed, either, that when Fernel’s father-in-law dismissed 
the utility of mathematics as of little consequence (‘Apart from a modicum of 
arithmetic and geometry it touched society little or not at all’), he spoke merely from 
ignorance. For one thing, we should not forget that the words attributed to the father-
in-law must have been reported to Plancy by Fernel himself, during the last ten years 
of his life, and some twenty years or so after the incident. In a sense, what we are 
reading is not so much a specific utterance by one man but a reconstruction (by Fernel 
when he reported it to his secretary in recollection, and subsequently by Plancy, when 
he came to write Fernel’s Vita) of the kind of arguments familiarly used by the 
learned against mathematics. To support the suggestion that late Renaissance thinkers 
did not always see the practical usefulness of mathematics, we need look no further 
than Francis Bacon. Here was a thinker whose historical reputation rests to a large 
extent on the fact that he saw, when others did not, that knowledge of the natural 
world should not be regarded as knowledge for its own sake, but should be put to use 
to improve the lot of mankind. As is well known, however, Bacon never considered 
that mathematical knowledge had a major role to play in his vision for the betterment 
of our lives.  
 Again, this cannot be put down to an unfortunate oversight on Bacon’s part; 
something that he overlooked but would have seized upon (we can suppose) had he 
seen it. Bacon did discuss mathematics in both the initial Advancement of Learning 
(1605) and its expanded version, De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum (1623), but 
the only use for it that he seems to have recognised, as the humanists had before him, 
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was in pedagogy, for sharpening the wits and aiding concentration (Gaukroger, 2001, 
pp. 20-27). It is worth remembering also that Bacon’s father, Sir Nicholas, was 
involved in the plans to reconstruct Dover harbour in the 1570s, and was involved in 
the appointment of some of the leading English mathematicians who worked on the 
project as surveyors, engineers, and architects. Furthermore, Sir Nicholas himself 
showed a strong personal fascination with mathematics.
31
 Francis could hardly have 
missed the practical importance to England of what was, after all, the largest civil 
engineering scheme in Elizabethan Britain, particularly in view of his father’s 
personal involvement, and yet when he came to develop his own ideas about how 
knowledge of nature could be put to use for the benefit of mankind, he gave no 
thought to a role for mathematics. It seems that the separation between mathematics 
and natural philosophy was still so effective, in the early decades of the seventeenth-
century, that it was easy for Bacon to disregard mathematics while he was seeking to 
reform natural philosophy. Bacon wanted to reform natural philosophy to make it not 
only more authentic than Aristotelian natural philosophy, but also more useful. It is 
clear from his writings that the model he had in mind for useful natural knowledge 
was not mathematics, however, but natural magic (Rossi, 1968; Henry, 2002). 
Knowledge of supposed magical influences and interactions between things was 
always seen as something to be exploited for pragmatic benefits, and after the 
Renaissance recovery of the Corpus Hermeticum and other supposedly magical 
ancient writings such magical knowledge came to be regarded as part of the true 
ancient wisdom or philosophy.
32
 It would have seemed natural to Bacon to look to the 
newly revived magical tradition, therefore, as a way of reforming natural philosophy. 
The same could hardly be said of mathematics. Because mathematics did not, and 
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could not, offer causal explanations of natural phenomena, Bacon could, and did, 
dismiss it as irrelevant to his purposes. 
 Given the background that we have been surveying, a background which 
coloured nearly everyone’s perception of mathematics from before Fernel’s time 
through to Francis Bacon’s and even beyond (many, after all, were still puzzled by the 
title of Newton’s great book when it appeared in 1687—they wondered how there 
could be ‘mathematical principles’ of natural philosophy), it is hardly surprising that 
Fernel’s family, and other members of his household, such as Guillaume Plancy, 
should regard mathematics as a largely futile and sterile occupation. Irrespective of 
the innovatory work of men like Regiomontanus, Copernicus, Lefèvre d’Étaples, 
Fine, and many others who are now recognised by historians as greater or lesser 
contributors to the ‘mathematization of the world picture’, for most learned men, as 
for Fernel’s father-in-law, ‘Mathematics made no contribution to the public weal’, 
and ‘Apart from a modicum of arithmetic and geometry it touched society little or not 
at all’ (Sherrington, 1946, p. 154; Fernel, 1607, sig. *6r). 
 
Conclusion 
If Fernel was finally aroused from his slumbers on the quick-sands of the sirens by the 
distress of his wife and the anger of his father-in-law, and began to realise that he 
must choose a more suitable profession than that of mathematical practitioner, he did 
not need to look far. Fernel was, as we have seen, undertaking his mathematical work 
at the same time that he was training to be a physician. He completed the four-year 
curriculum leading to his MD in about 1530, and so in 1527 and 1528, the years he 
published his mathematical works, he must have been trying to combine his medical 
studies with his own commitment to mathematics. It was an easy matter, therefore, for 
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Fernel to simply concentrate on medicine. Indeed, the impression Plancy’s Vita 
presents is that Fernel resisted a medical calling during the time when he tried to 
establish a career as a cosmographer. Having abandoned mathematics, however, 
Fernel soon rose to become the most admired physician in France and one of the most 
admired throughout Europe.  
Nobody was ever in any doubt of the usefulness of medicine to society, of 
course, but it also had the advantage over mathematics that it was always perceived to 
go hand-in-hand with natural philosophy. Even Aristotle was said to have declared 
medicine and natural philosophy to be sisters.
33
 Certainly, Fernel’s own medical 
works paid a great deal of attention to natural philosophical considerations. His first 
major work (although withheld from the press until after he had published subsequent 
works), De abditis rerum causis (Paris, 1548), was divided into two parts, the first 
explicitly dealing with natural philosophy and the second with medicine. His earliest 
published work, De naturali parte medicinae (Paris, 1542), later became known 
simply as the Physiologia. This later title appropriated a term that usually referred to 
the whole of natural philosophy, and turned it into a term having reference only to the 
natural workings of the human body. Again, this suggests Fernel’s own belief in the 
close interconnectedness of natural philosophy and medicine (Fernel, 2005, pp. 3-4). 
This traditional alliance between medicine and natural philosophy may not have been 
much of a consideration for practising mathematicians, but in the eyes of most 
educated men it is likely to have ensured that medicine was regarded as more 
intellectually and culturally significant than mathematics. We can see this even in the 
reported speech which Plancy attributes to Fernel’s father-in-law. ‘On the other hand’, 
he says to his son-in-law after insisting mathematics touches society hardly at all, 
‘when we turn our gaze to medicine we find it a science occupied either with sublime 
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enquiry into Nature or with deeds of beneficence and utility. It is of right the worthiest 
of all the arts.’ Medicine is not just pragmatically useful but leads to a real 
understanding of the natural world. It was to be a very long time indeed before 
mathematics would be seen by educated persons routinely to have the same relevance 
to our understanding of nature. In the meantime, medicine remained the indispensable 
companion of natural philosophy, and Fernel’s father-in-law spoke for a number of 
succeeding generations when he said that ‘Mathematics offers no comparison with it’ 
(Sherrington, 1946, p. 154; Fernel, 1607, sig. *6r). 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 Westman 1980; Jardine, 1988; De Pace, 1993; Høyrup, 1994; Dear, 1995; Mancosu, 
1996. 
2
 Sherrington (1946); the editor’s introduction in Fernel (2003), pp. 1-12; Siraisi 
(2007), pp. 122-25. 
3
 There is another early source, published before Plancy’s Vita, but it is shorter than 
Plancy’s and generally assumed to be based on access to a manuscript copy of Plancy. 
It appears in Thevet, 1584. On this and other early biographies, see Sherrington, 1946, 
pp. 148-9. 
4
 Sherrington, 1946, provides a complete list of editions of Fernel’s works, pp. 187-
207. 
5
 There were, of course, other innovators in the medical sciences in this period, 
particularly in the field of anatomy (Vesalius, Fabricius, etc.), but only Paracelsus, 
Fracastoro, and Fernel deliberately tried to develop a new theory of health and 
disease, intended to go beyond the prevailing Galenic theory. 
6
 On Paracelsus, see Pagel, 1958; Weeks, 1997; Grell, 1998. On Fracastoro, see Di 
Leo, 1953; Peruzzi, 1995. On Fernel, see Figard, 1903; Sherrington, 1946; and the 
editors’ introductions in Fernel, 2003 and 2005. See also the special issue of the 
journal, Corpus, devoted to Fernel: Kany-Turpin, 2002.  
7
 The quotation is from Guillaume Plancy’s Vita of Fernel, written about 1567 and 
first published in 1607: Guillaume Plancy, ‘Ioannis Fernelii D. Medici Vita’, in 
Fernel, 1607. A full translation of this is included in Sherrington, 1946, pp. 150-70, 
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and I quote from this throughout. The 1607 Vita is unpaginated, but for those who 
wish to consult the Latin, I provide the printer’s signature marks in Fernel, 1607, 
following the references to Sherrington’s translation. On Fernel’s influence see 
Sherrington, 1946, pp. 98-146; Brockliss, 1993; Brockliss and Jones, 1997, pp. 128-
38.  
8
 On the associations between medicine and mathematics see, for example, Maclean, 
2002, pp. 171-90. The distinguished scholar Lynn Thorndike wrote that Fernel 
‘continued the common medieval association of mathematics with medicine’; see 
Thorndike, 1941, p. 557.  
9
 See Westman (1980); Feingold (1984); and Schmitt (1984). 
10
 See Mahoney (1994), 12. 
11
 On patronage, Dawbarn and Pumfrey, 2004; Johnston, 2006. On Galileo, Biagioli, 
1993. On Descartes, for example, Gaukroger, 1995. See also, for a general survey of 
the different social backgrounds of mathematicians in this period, Biagioli, 1989.  
12
 Although it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of practical 
mathematics. Fine was evidently interested in cosmography, cartography and related 
aspects of the mathematical sciences, but he disdained the use of mathematics in 
commerce. See Davies, 1960, pp. 30-31. 
13
 On Jacques Govea see Sherrington, 1946, p. 172. Jacques was uncle to the more 
famous humanist scholar Andreas Govea, who disputed with Petrus Ramus. I have 
been unable to discover anything about Martin Dolet (which perhaps explains why 
Sherrington makes no mention of him, in marked contrast to his treatment of Govea). 
Presumably he is the same Martin Dolet who published at Paris, in about 1508. It is 
possible that he acted as a patronage broker; this is discussed below.   
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14
 Practical utility seems to have been one of the two main concerns of potential 
patrons; the other being a concern for ostentatious or spectacular display, which 
would enhance the fame and prestige of the patron. For a full discussion of the nature 
of Renaissance patronage see Dawbarn and Pumfrey, 2004. See also, Moran, 1991. 
As far as I am aware there has been no previous discussion of Fernel’s attempts to 
attract patronage. 
15
 Copernicus, 1992, pp. 9-10; Vogel, 2006, pp. 479-80; Randles, 1993, pp. 69-70. 
There is no reason to suppose, however, that Copernicus knew of Fernel’s 
Cosmotheoria.  
16
 Albert van Helden says that ‘all educated persons after about 1250 were familiar 
with the principle of nesting spheres and the cosmic dimensions derived from it’ 
(Helden, 1985, p. 37). Unfortunately van Helden overlooks Fernel’s contribution to 
this aspect of cosmology. 
17
 For a fuller discussion of this aspect of the mathematics of proportions, see Høyrup, 
1994, pp. 163-4. On the science of the good life see Jones, 2006. 
18
 Fernel (1528b), sig. Aiiiir For a discussion of the use of proportions in medicine see 
McVaugh (1987). 
19
 Although Plancy makes Fernel’s father-in-law play the lead role here, Fernel’s wife 
came to the fore in later accounts. Lalande, 1771, Tome I, p.189, for example, said of 
Fernel that ‘il en auroit fait davantage si sa femme ne l’eût forcé, pour ainsi dire, à 
quitter l’étude stérile des Mathematiques’. It is significant for our purposes that 
Lalande attributes to Fernel’s wife a belief that mathematics is a sterile pursuit. 
20
 Sherrington, 1946, p. 4, where Sherrington tells us Fernel’s books cost 5 sols each, 
and the two books of plates were 10 and 12 sols each. See also Sherrington, 1946, pp. 
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15, 188 and 189. Sherrington cites as his source, Renouard, 1526-46, p. 428, but I 
have been unable to check this. 
21
 Sherrington, 1946, p. 160; Fernel, 1607, sig. **2v. Plancy is reflecting his master’s 
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